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Summary 
This thesis takes a closer look at what affects the default rate in Banco      
D-MIRO, one of the largest microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Ecuador.     
This MFI provides over 35,000 local borrowers with financial services. Banco 
D-MIRO’s targeted markets are marginalized families and micro-
entrepreneurs, groups which have been excluded from the traditional 
financial system for different reasons, such as culture, sex, race, poverty, 
disability, and illness. 
The dominant microfinance discourse suggests that women’s default rate is 
lower than the default rate for men, and also that they use the loans for 
better purposes. My research question is:  
Are female loan clients in D-MIRO less delayed on their loans than men? 
In addition to this I want to investigate if there are different factors affecting 
the default rate of men and women. 
First I will look at literature discussing these topics to find out what factors 
are typically used to explain differences in default rate. Then I will use 
regression analysis to analyze a dataset that contains information about loan 
clients from D-MIRO. The dataset contains information about both male and 
female borrowers. I chose to focus my analyses on the variables age, 
educational level and marital status to investigate whether these factors 
correlate with repayment. It seems to be no statistically significant difference 
between men and women on the repayment rate. However, investigating the 
differential impact of these other variables I find some differences between 
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1 Introduction 
"Give a man a fish, he'll eat for a day. Give a woman microcredit, she, 
her husband, her children and her extended family will eat for a 
lifetime." – Bono 
In 2006 Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank received the Nobel Peace 
Prize, and it seemed as if the popularity of the microfinance movement would 
never end. There are many good reasons why microfinance gained such 
enormous support in the first place. Did we finally have a cure against 
poverty? Media, donors, rock stars, policy-makers and the public in general, 
embraced this idea of poor people lifting themselves out of poverty. Not 
through humble begging, but with their own willpower and determination, 
using entrepreneurial creativity to create businesses.  Decades with aid to 
poor countries had in many cases not seemed to lead to a noteworthy 
improvement of growth and better distribution of wealth. The typical history 
of foreign aid too often includes stories of corruption, reports of money not 
reaching the ones who need it the most, and failure of understanding local 
culture and way of living.  
After a few years, most of the enthusiasm for microfinance had faded away. 
Stories of poor people tricked into debt-traps became well known, and soon 
the number of critics seemed to exceed its supporters.  
The aim of this thesis is not to discuss to what degree microfinance 
contributes to poverty-reduction.  Not every poor person is born to be an 
entrepreneur. However, as Banerjee et al. (2011) among others point out, 
microfinance is just one of the instruments in the fight against poverty.  
Lending out money to poor people without security is risky business. One of 
the keys to keep microfinance sustainable and self-driven is to keep the 
default rates as low as possible.  
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The focus on women is one of the main characteristics of MFIs. Even though 
many claim that female loan clients are more reliable, there is little empirical 
evidence of this actually being true.   
Taking a closer look at research done in this area, and analyzing the data 
available, I will hopefully be able to say something about what affects the 
default rate in D-MIRO, thus making it possible for this MFI to  organize 
their credit-services in a better way.   
This thesis is organized the following way: 
In section 2, I briefly describe the background and goals of the microfinance 
movement. Then in chapter 3 I describe similar studies and their findings. In 
section 4 the results of the regression analysis are shown. This section also 
contains a discussion of the results, and I compare those to results from 
other studies. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Microfinance 
2.1.1 Defining microfinance 
Microfinance is not always defined in the clearest way. Armendáriz (2011) 
describes microfinance for loans (i.e. microcredit) to be the supply of small-
scale financial services to people who are without access to traditional 
banking services. Through its promotion of this small-scale lending Grameen 
Bank has become known worldwide for its work within this field, and is often 
given much credit for the invention of this type of loans. (Smillie 2009) 
2.1.2 More than credit 
Nevertheless, microfinance is about more than just credit. Today several 
programs offer saving products. In addition different types of insurances are 
getting more and more popular in the group of products that financial 
institutions offer poor people. Karland and Goldberg (2011) emphasize that 
today there are no longer only special institutions for the poor that offer 
microfinance services, since more and more commercial banks and 
insurance companies have started to downscale in order to reach new 
groups of clients. Consumer durables companies are also aiming at poor 
people with microcredit arrangements, and even Wal-Mart offers transferring 
services. From this it seems likely that not all programs labeled as 
“microfinance” corresponds well with what most people associates with it. 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, CGAP (2013), uses the following 
definition on their web page:   
“The term "microfinance," once associated almost exclusively with small-
value loans to the poor, is now increasingly used to refer to a broad array of 
products (including payments, savings, and insurance) tailored to meet the 
particular needs of low-income individuals.” 
The problem with labeling programs that differ a lot from each other as 
microfinance programs is the underlying message that the programs can be 
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benchmarked against other microfinance programs. If the services of the 
different programs offered are very different from each other, it may be hard 
to conclude why one program is more successful than another.  
As Hval (2009) remarks, microfinance can therefore be described as a more 
general description of financial services targeting the poor, while microcredit 
focuses only on the aspect of lending.  
 
2.2  Background 
The tale typically starts with Muhammad Yunus and how his project of 
lending a small sum to a group of poor women in Bangladesh in the 1970s a 
few decades later has grown to serve more than 8 million poor families with 
loans, insurances and other services (Grameen Bank). When Yunus together 
with Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for their efforts to 
create economic and social development from below, the concept suddenly 
became world famous. However, as Mersland and Strøm (2012) point out, 
financial services for the poor is something that goes much further back 
than this.  
According to Moyo (2009) the reason for the success of Yunus and Grameen 
Bank was their realization of the community of interdependence and trust 
that was present in many poor villages, which seemed to lack other obvious 
visible assets. Converting this interdependence into collateral, in her 
opinion, was what made Grameen Bank possible. 
Smillie (2009) describes the enormous support experienced by the 
microfinance movement during the 1990s. A Microcredit Summit was held in 
Washington in 1997, and here a campaign to reach 100 million of the 
world’s poorest families was introduced. The Microcredit Summit especially 
emphasized the aim of targeting the women of those families, with credit for 
self-employment and other financial and business services by the year 2005.  
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2005 was by the UN declared the “Year of Microcredit”. At  the end of 2006 
the Microcredit Summit Campaign reported that its targets of 100 million 
borrowers had been exceeded by 33 millions. Another target of 175 million 
was set for 2015. (Microcredit Summit Campaign) 
The high lending rates are often described as a common feature of 
microcredit, and have been criticized by many. How can people borrow 
themselves out of poverty, paying interest rates which often are much higher 
than many consumer credit lending banks in richer countries? 
The public’s view on the microfinance industry changed drastically only few 
years after Yunus won the Nobel Prize. As Strøm and Mersland (2012,490) 
express it; “the journey from a hero to a crook took 4 years.” 
This turn was mainly caused by events that took place in 2010 and 2011, 
when news arrived of tragic suicides in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. 
It seemed that these suicides were a result of strict methods of collecting 
MF-loans. News articles with headlines such as “India's micro-finance suicide 
epidemic” (BBC) made it clear that microfinance had not lived up to its 
expectations.  
The documentary “Caught in Micro Debt” shown by The Norwegian 
Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) in November 2010 took a critical look at the 
microfinance industry, its benefits to the developing countries, and also 
claimed that Yunus had spent money from Norway given as aid on projects 
not involved with microcredit operations. Even though Norwegian authorities 
discharged him of these accusations, as Mersland and Strøm (2012) point 
out, this documentary had serious consequences for Yunus. His opponents 
used this case to have him removed as leader of the Grameen Bank.  
Another result of this documentary was soon clear; a serious questioning of 
practices in the microfinance industry. From being praised by the public as 
a solution to world poverty, it was now being met by serious criticism. Appel 
and Karland (2011) describe microfinance as a perfect example of something 
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that created enormous enthusiasm and support before there existed 
evidence of its effects, a characterization that seem to be spot on.  
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs at every corner? 
Banerjee et al. (2011) outline the basic premise of Yunus’s world view, which 
they believe to be shared by a majority in the microfinance movement; that 
everybody has a possibility of being a successful entrepreneur. They point to 
two distinct explanations for why poor people should be especially likely to 
find such incredible opportunities: that they have not been given a chance 
before, so their ideas are new, and less likely to have been tried before, and 
also the fact that the market so far has ignored the group at the bottom of 
the pyramid. But as they remark, there are reasons for concern. While there 
are many poor people operating businesses, to a large extent the businesses 
they manage are very small. And for the most part these businesses don’t 
make a lot of money.  
Smillie (2009) also questions why so many seem to believe that to start a 
business is every poor person’s way out of poverty. He acknowledges that if 
lending to poor people can be financially sustainable, it would be of great 
interest since it would not lead to aid dependency. But, he is not convinced 
that the poor as a group are especially more fit to be entrepreneurs than 
others.   
Nevertheless, this being noted, microcredit and other types of helping small 
businesses may still have an enormous important role to play in poor 
people’s lives. As Banerjee et al. (2011) observe, these tiny businesses may 
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2.2.2 New opportunities to the poor 
Poor people’s lack of access to conventional financial services has often been 
described as their reason of staying in poverty. As Sundaresan (2008) 
comments, it is hard to imagine how Brazil, China and India could develop 
before their large number of poor inhabitants easily could gain access to 
essential financial services, which he believes to be crucial to get out of 
poverty. He also points to the fact that in many developing economies a 
significant part of the population is not able to gain access to organized 
financial institutions and markets, due to being extremely poor, not well 
educated and without possibilities of secure income.   
However, offering banking opportunities to people who have been excluded 
from these types of services is not without challenges. Perhaps the main 
reason why poor peoples lack access to markets is the fact that lenders and 
service providers in the formal markets have very little information about the 
potential customers of their services.  
 
2.2.3  Information asymmetries 
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems arise as a consequence of 
asymmetric information between the lending institution and the borrower. 
The World Bank (2008) describes risk management and high transaction 
costs of processing, monitoring and administering small loans, to be the 
main challenges of delivering credit. De Aghion and Morduch (2004), among 
others, elaborate on the information asymmetries that are linked to these 
risks. It could be due to adverse selection, where the lender is unable to 
distinguish between borrowers with high or low risk.  Another explanation is 
that it could come from moral hazard, which is the tendency of borrowers of 
spending their loan on projects which are not profitable, such that they are 
less likely to repay their loan, and the inability of the lender to discover and 
discourage such behavior. The bank can foresee this, and as De Aghion and 
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Morduch (ibid) point out, this would lead to an increase in interest rates to 
be able to compensate for the additional risk.  
The important role of peer monitoring is emphasized by Stiglitz (1990). He 
explains how this can create incentives to monitor each other, and where it 
is likely that borrowers would like to report if one of the other borrowers 
uses a risky technique.  
Karlan and Zinman’s (2009) study of a South African consumer lender show 
how dynamic incentives, such as guarantee of repeated lending, have been 
another way to work against moral hazard when working with risky 
customers. Similarly, other studies show that giving loan clients the 
expectation of repeated loans will lead to a reduction of risky investments, 
and also to an improvement in repayment behavior. (World Bank 2008)  
 
2.2.4  A growing field 
Figure 1: Shows growth in total loans and the MFI’s average growth in loan 
portfolios to MFI’s who report to http://mixmarket.org from 1998- 2009.  
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In the last years there has been an enormous growth on the market for 
microfinance. Figure 1, taken from Mersland and Strøm (2012) describes 
growth in total loans (black) and the average increase in loan portfolios to 
MFI’s who report to MIX Market from 1998 to 2009. This organization 
provides data on more than 2100 MFIs in the developing world covering 94 
million borrowers (MIX Market).  
We can see how the MFIs average portfolio growth has increased from 1998- 
2009. For several years growth in this sector has been between 40-60 %, and 
on average portfolios have grown by 41.5 %. Mersland and Strøm (2012) 
explain that this could be due to the fact that the number of MFIs has 
increased in this period. However, they also remark that growth in each MFI 
has been strong, with an annual average growth rate of over 20 % for several 
years. These growth rates remained positive even in 2008, when the financial 
crisis hit most of the global economy.  In 2009 the number of MFIs shrank 
from 1358 to 1139, but at the same time there was an increase in loans, 
which led to a strong growth in the average growth rate this year.  
 
2.2.5 Key characteristics 
Karland and Goldberg (2011) point to the following 9 features of 
microfinance: 
(1) Small transactions and minimum balances (whether loans, savings, or 
insurance) 
(2) Loans for entrepreneurial activity 
(3) Collateral-free loans 
(4) Group lending 
(5) Focus on poor clients 
(6) Focus on female clients 
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(7) Simple application processes 
(8) Provision of services in underserved communities 
(9) Market-level interest rates  
Whether these descriptions are necessary for a program to be labeled as 
microfinance can be discussed. Different MFIs operate in very different ways 
regarding their conditions for a loan. Some MFIs visit clients to confirm that 
their loans are used for the entrepreneurial activities they are supposed to. 
Others may choose not to ask many questions as long as they get their 
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2.3  Focus on women 
A majority of MFIs focus on women. The attention of the microfinance 
movement has been focused on working for direct access to credit for poor 
people and especially poor women (World Bank 2008).  The overwhelmingly 
representation of women, as Sundaresan (2008) brings up, has been one of 
the most characteristic features of microfinance, since it was popularized in 
the middle of the 1970s in Bangladesh. 
As discussed by Appel and Karlan (2011), it has been argued that women are 
better at repaying their loans. It is also claimed, for instance by Thomas 
(1990) that a higher share of their earnings passes on to their families, 
leading to an increase in the households spending on food and education for 
their children. Some MFIs have spoken of their operations nearly failing until 
they shifted their lending practices to focus on female clients. 
Mayoux (2001) offers these main arguments for targeting women; gender 
equality, poverty reduction, and that it will lead to MFI efficiency. He argues 
that group-based microfinance is an advantage especially for women, not 
only having an impact on poverty reduction, but also on women's 
empowerment. 
A large number of female MF-clients are married or live with a partner, and 
have children. A common belief among many MFIs has been that focusing on 
women will have a greater impact in poverty-reduction, than focusing on 
men. Thomas (1990) studied child health in Brazil, measured by survival 
probabilities, height-for-age and weight-for-height, together with households 
intake of nourishing food. He observed that this tended to rise if additional 
non-labor income was administered by women instead of men. In addition 
he found that income attributed to the mother instead of the father had a 




It is also shown in studies from Thailand that non-labor income in the hands 
of women tends to reduce fertility more than non-labor income possessed by 
men (Sundaresan 2008)  
An important empirical study on microfinance and gender which has had a 
large influence on the increased focus on women is found in a 1998 study by 
Pitt and Khandker.  Using cross-section data from Bangladesh for 1991-
1992, they discuss different sorts of biases that could arise, such as if the 
loan clients who self select themselves into a microfinance program, are the 
ones who are poorest and also the ones who are most skilled in 
entrepreneurial activities. They believe it to be unlikely that credit programs 
are allocated across the villages of Bangladesh in a random way, pointing to 
the fact that program officials often note that they place programs in poorer 
and more flood prone areas, as well as in areas in which villagers have 
requested program services. As pointed out here, the problem with treating 
the timing and placement of programs as random in these cases, can lead to 
serious mismeasurement of the effectiveness of the programs. By 
overestimating the effect these microfinance projects could have on reducing 
poverty, the results could differ a lot if these programs started admitting 
poorer clients, with less entrepreneurial skills.   
Pitt and Khandker use an instrumental variable (IV) in their study; land-
ownership, which correlates with the variable they want to study, but not 
with the result of the business. To qualify for a microloan, borrowers were 
not allowed to own more than half an acre of land. In their study they used 
this IV to compare villages which received the possibility to receive 
microfinance to control villages without this opportunity. Then they were 
able to study differences in entrepreneurial abilities between villages where 
the poor with little/no land received loans versus control villages were poor 
with little/no land did not have access to microloans since there were not 
that many microfinance suppliers. They also looked at the role of gender-
specific credit. 
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The intention of this study was to see if the behavior of the credit participant 
varied with gender. They report that when 100 takas were lent to men, this 
would lead to 11 takas going into household expenditures (like 
food/nutrition/working tools), but the same amount lent out to a woman 
would lead to 18 takas spent on household expenditures.  
 
The main findings of this study are well known, and the results have to a 
large degree been influential for the tendency to focus donor’s aid as 
subsidized loans for women. Sundaresan (2008) points out that it would be 
bold to claim that the findings of Pitt and Khandker alone can be held 
responsible for having influenced the bias towards women in recent 
microfinance initiatives. He emphasizes however, that in the absence of any 
countervailing empirical evidence, Pitt and Khandker’s findings contributed 
to the norms and operational practices of CGAP, World Bank, as well as 
many other multilateral organizations engaged in providing subsidized 
microfinance. The priority of these institutions has been to direct by 
subsidies loans to women.  
The findings from Bangladesh were later attacked by Roodman and Morduch 
(2009) who claimed to have been able to prove that the effect discovered by 
Pitt and Khandker did not exist. This criticism was later responded by Pitt, 
who pointed out that Roodman and Morduch had committed errors in their 
statistical work, and that the results from 1998 still could be counted as 
valid. Mersland and Strøm (2011) describe this academic dispute, and 
conclude that to in what degree the history of Pitt & Khandker vs. Roodman 
& Morduch can be used to anything, it is that working with statistics on 
poor people’s economy is very hard. Also Banerjee et al. (2009) comment on 
these different studies, and sum up that there is so far no consensus among 





2.3.1 Women- better credit risk or not? 
Even though it is a common belief that repayment rates are higher for 
women, it is not well documented. Evidence from consumer loans in South 
Africa (Karland and Zinman 2010) show that women are 3 % less likely to 
default on their loans, from a mean of 15 % default. The reason for this is 
debatable. Appel and Karlan (2011) discuss different reasons for this: Some 
claim that women are simply more responsible, while some argue that 
women, having fewer borrowing options than men, are careful of jeopardizing 
their relationship with their MFI by defaulting. They point out that if this is 
true, we may expect to see the repayment gap diminish over time as financial 
access expands. 
The cost of lending out to women is often higher than lending out to men, 
because of their average loan size, which often is smaller (Agier and Szafarz 
2010).  D'Espallier et al (2009), remark that from a financial perspective 
focusing on women can be both positive and negative. They state that 
women do repay at a higher rate, which leads to lower risk and increases the 
profitability. On the other hand, they point out that MFIs that focus on 
women usually make use of smaller loans, something that leads to an 
increase in their operational costs. The net result from their study is that 
MFIs with a special focus on women have, on average, similar overall 
profitability measures. 
Other problems could arise by only making microloans available for women. 
Sundaresan (2008) discusses how the bias in favor of loans to women in MF 
has been followed by an increasing trend to exclude men from microfinance 
services, especially at very low income levels. Sundaresan claims there are 
two main implications from focusing only on women. On the one hand, 
higher income for women may lead to increased health and education- 
benefits for both themselves and members of their household. On the other 
hand, excluding men from subsidized finance might lead to disagreements, 
and to men supporting them less, leading to smaller effects on health and 
education for all household members.  
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Women were not the center of attention for the first initiatives to supply 
credit in poor countries through development banks and cooperative 
movements. This changed rapidly with the development of modern MFIs. 
Numbers from the Grameen Bank is a good example of this increased 
interest in women. Here the proportion of female loan clients grew from 44 % 
in 1983 to 95 % in 2001. (D'Espallier et al. 2009) 
D’Espallier et al. (ibid) use a global dataset of 379 MFIs in seventy-three 
countries to investigate the characteristics of MFIs that have a gender bias 
and how this bias affects loan clients’ financial performance. In their 
dataset, women represent 73 % of MF customers on average, and 42 % of 
MFIs declare a conscious gender bias towards women. Their result indicate 
that MFIs with a conscious gender bias can be associated with group lending 
methodologies, international orientation, female leadership, smaller loans, 
and a non commercial legal status. Regarding performance, their findings 
show that having a conscious gender bias significantly leads to an 
improvement of repayment, but it does not lead to an increased overall 
profitability. The positive repayment effect that is associated with a focus on 
women is set back by higher costs. This is related to smaller loans. The lack 
of empirical evidence on many of the theoretical arguments concerning 
female targeting as well as its consequences is a concern of the authors; they 
emphasis that MFI financial performance is more than just repayment, and 
therefore the financial efficiency of targeting women is far from obvious. They 
refer to various reasons for why targeting women is more costly; that they 
borrow smaller amounts, that they are less mobile and less educated, and 
that they need additional services (health, education, literacy, child care, 
etc.) and perhaps additional monitoring. Therefore, they conclude that a 
focus on women and overall MFI financial performance goes further than 
repayment rates and should have much attention. 
To develop systems that make it possible to observe and evaluate the impact 
gender has on microfinance programs seem to be of huge importance for the 
further course of MFIs. And as Armendáriz and Morduch (2007) point out, it 
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is also important to remember that issues concerning gender are given by 
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3 Review of similar studies 
Default-rates differ a lot between different banks. There may be several 
reasons for this, and even though the most universal feature of MFI is the 
targeting of poor people, there may be local characteristics that make it hard 
to draw universal conclusions from findings in one country to another. 
However, to be able to decide which areas to concentrate on, a review of 
similar studies is necessary.   
3.1  No “perfect” representative 
Extensive research has been done to investigate reasons for default-rate in 
similar institutions. Nevertheless, as D’Espallier et al. (2009) point out, there 
is no dataset which perfectly illustrates the microfinance field. The evidence 
varies a lot and is often anecdotal.  Factors such as the age of the MFI, 
different practices regarding financial training before receiving a loan, age of 
loan clients, and other types of variation may be possible reasons for 
fluctuations in default-rates, even though many MFIs target similar groups. 
As mentioned earlier, the findings of D’Espallier et al. (ibid) suggest that 
women in general are better at repaying microcredit loans, and thus prove 
policy makers and practitioners who have claimed this for a long time, to be 
right. They remark that higher female repayment rate does not necessarily 
mean higher welfare for women. It could be that it is the consequence of a 
debt trap, and they also suggest that it could be due to enforcement 
practices that are more feared by the female loan clients.  
However, there is little consensus among academics about how much can be 
explained by gender when it comes to repayment rates.  
Anthony and Horne (2003) use data on microcredit loans from a non profit 
organization primarily based in New England to analyze the role of gender for 
microcredit loan-repayment. The result of their analyses shows that for a 
model where only gender is included, women appear to be less likely than 
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men to default. But when they include group gender composition to the 
model, the individual gender is no longer significant. Their results suggest 
that individuals who belong to groups containing a bigger proportion of 
women are less likely to default on their loan.  
Microcredit is no longer only available for small scale entrepreneurs in the 
poorest countries. Also in the United States there are development 
practitioners who have found inspiration from well known MFIs, and offer 
small scale loans to poor people in America’s urban areas.  Bhatt and Thang 
(2002) discuss challenges facing these MFI’s, and also they express their 
concern that most accounts of loan repayment performance are anecdotal, 
and often paint a confusing picture of the factors that might explain high 
repayment rates. Bhatt and Thang investigate the determinants for 
repayment rate for 4 microcredit programs in the US. Their data show that 
higher levels of education and proximity to the lending agency leads to better 
repayment performance. In their study the borrower’s gender does not seem 
to affect chances of repayment.   
Field and Pande (2008) used data from a field experiment on repayment 
schedules conducted in urban India to investigate whether the frequency of 
repayment would have impact on the repayment rate of loans. They found 
that changing from weekly to monthly installments did not lead to any 
changes in the repayment ability of the loan clients. This finding could have 
large implications for the efficiency of MFIs. Weekly collection of repayment 
has been believed to help reduce default risk in absence of collateral, but as 
Field and Pande point out, this leads to higher costs for the MFIs. They also 
remark that the frequency of repayment may be more important for the 
discipline if loan clients advance to larger loans. 
The proportion of lenders with complete primary education has been claimed 
by Olomola and Niser (2000) to be key in determining the repayment rate of 
the borrowers. They also point to that the size of the loan, member regularity 
at meetings, use of loans, borrowing experience and savings mobilized in 
previous years are crucial.  
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Roslan and Karim (2009) examine the determinants of loan repayment 
among borrowers of Agrobank, a commercial bank in Malaysia, which is 
founded as a development finance institution directly involved in financing 
the agriculture sector. They report that the probability of default in this bank 
is influenced by the gender of the borrower, type of business activity, 
amount of loan, training and the repayment period. Regarding gender, their 
analysis shows that the probability of default is lower among female 
borrowers and this study thus seem to support the argument that women 
represent a lower credit risk. Another factor that affects the repayment rate 
is which type of business the loan clients borrow to invest in. In this case 
they find that borrowers involved in the service-industry have a lower 
probability of default, compared to those who invest in production activities. 
Their analysis also suggest that the larger the size of the loan, the lower the 
probability of default. In addition they found that the probability to default is 
higher for longer repayment periods. They also find that giving loan clients 
financial training led to improvements of the default rate.   
Whether this bank uses the practice of promising repeated lending, meaning 
that borrowers in the beginning are granted small loans, and that they may 
increase loan size when they can prove they are able to handle the smaller 
sums, is not mentioned. If this is the case, it may be likely that we face a 
problem of endogeneity; that those granted the bigger loans are the ones who 
have proved to be most credit-worthy, and then it is not possible to tell 
whether giving out larger loans will lead to higher repayment rates.  
Does marital status explain default risk? Agarwal et al. (2010) investigate the 
effects of marriage on default rate when comparing two groups of borrowers: 
joint liable borrowers versus independent borrowers. 
In their data they find that the default risk is lower among joint liable 
borrowers, than with borrowers who don’t participate in joint-liability 
programs. They see that many of the joint liable borrowers are married, and 
that it therefore may be possible that the joint liability designation is simply 
covering the lower risk associated with marital status. When they estimate 
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the default model controlling for the effects of marriage, interesting 
differences in the default risk based on marital status are revealed. They find 
that married borrowers are 8.3 percent less likely to default than single 
borrowers. Second, the marginal effect for unmarried joint borrowers 
indicates that they are 3.8 percent less likely to default than single 
borrowers. In their study it appears that being married does significantly 
reduce the odds of default. 
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4 Empirical results    
This thesis investigates whether there are significant differences between 
men’s and women’s rate of default in the MFI D-MIRO in Ecuador. A 
majority of MFI’s target female loan-clients, arguing that women invest in 
less risky business, and spend more of their income on their family, thus 
having a greater impact on reducing poverty.  D-MIRO claims no special 
commitment to serve women. This makes it possible to look for differences 
between genders.  
4.1  Data 
The data is collected by D-MIRO, a MFI in Ecuador, which was founded in 
1997 by the Norwegian Mission Alliance. The dataset consists of 44 858 
observations. 
D-MIRO offers microcredit-loans to both men and women, and is therefore 
suitable for comparing the two groups. Compared with many other MFIs it 
has a quite even gender-distribution. This makes our data suitable for 
exploiting differences between repayment rates between men and women.  
Several reasons can be thought of as having an impact on the default-rate. 
There could be a problem of including too few variables in the analysis, as 
this could cause an omitted variable bias (Stock 2007). However, having to 
concentrate the analysis, some of the variables had to be omitted.   
4.1.1 Description of the data 
The dependent variable is the number of days a repayment is delayed 
(“delayed_pay”).  Microfinance institutions measure this in PAR (Portfolio at 
Risk), such as PAR30, where the number indicates how many days the loan 
client is delayed in repaying. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Ecuador 
operates with rules for these different levels of delay. From day 1 there are 
costs for the bank, since a certain percentage is charged from the account in 
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order to cover for future losses. The higher the level of PAR, the higher 
percentage has to be charged. PAR1 is therefore considered to be a serious 
deviation, and the bank follows this up carefully. The first 30 days the 
portfolios of the loan clients are followed up by their own loan consultant. 
The loan consultant will try to restructure to loan, and make new 
agreements for repayment. After these 30 days the case is followed up by 
special units, such as call-centers and the juridical department. If this 
doesn’t help, it will eventually lead to a case for placing debt for collection. 
This will lead to a registration in public payment records. All delays in 
repaying debt will lead to costs for the bank, and therefore are cases 
carefully followed up from day 1. (Andersen, 2012) 
Table 1: Description of data 
 Total St. dev Mean Min Max 
 
Percent 
Delayed pay 7855 306.13 96.7 0 2303 17.5 
Female loan clients 26 636 0.4911 0.5937 0 1 59.4 
Male loan clients 18 221 0.4911 0.4062 0 1 40.6 
Age 44 857 11.20 41 17 79 100 
Age young 424 0.09 19 17 20 1 
Age young adult 13 775 0.46 29 21 35 31 
Age adult 28 464 0.48 46 36 60 63 
Age old 2194 0.21 64 60 79 5 
No education 631 0.11 0.01 0 1 1 
Low education 19 546 0.49 0.44 0 1 44 
Medium education 24 529 0.49 0.547 0 1 54.7 
High education 151 0.05 0.003 0 1 0.3 
Married 12 989 0.45 0.29 0 1 29 
Divorced 1882 0.20 0.42 0 1 4.2 
Cohabit 10 707 0.42 0.24 0 1 24 
Widower 957 0.14 0.02 0 1 2 
Single 18 322 0.49 0.408 0 1 40.8 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables in my sample. This 
dataset contains information of 44 857 loan clients. The percentage of female 
clients in D-MIRO is shown by “female”: approximately 59 %. Even though 
the majority of the loan clients are women, this number is quite even 
compared with other banks, and when taken into account that 
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approximately 82.7 % of the 146.7 million poorest clients reached by 
microfinance are women (Microcredit Summit Campaign).  
The variable “age” shows the age of clients in the whole sample. The age of 
D-MIROs clients range from 17-79 years, and their average age are around 
41 years. Approximately 1 % of the customers are below 20 years old, 31 % 
are in the group between 21 and 35. Approximately 63 % are in the group 
between 35 and 60, and 5 % in the group over 60. 
Then the loan client’s level of education is presented. Approximately 1 % of 
the loan clients in this sample have not obtained any sort of formal 
education. 44 % have finished the lowest level of education. The description 
“Low education” consists of the educational level “basic” and “primary”. The 
description “Medium education” contains two variables; those finished with 
three years of secondary school, and those who have completed 6 years of 
secondary school. Only 0.3 % of the loan clients in this sample have finished 
“higher education”, meaning that they have completed minimum 4 years of 
higher education. Married, divorced, cohabit, widower and single tells us the 
marital status of clients in our sample.  29 % of the loan clients are married, 
4.2 % are divorced, 24 % are cohabiting and 2 % are widowers. There is a 










4.2  Econometric approach 
To find out which variables are correlated with loan clients default-rate in D-
MIRO, I use the method of linear regression. Using this method, some classic 
econometric challenges are encountered. By estimating the effect of one 
variable on the default rate, I may mistakenly have excluded other variables 
that could have been relevant to include in the regression. This could come 
from mistakenly not considering the variable to be relevant for this analysis, 
or due to difficulties regarding ways of measuring this variable. This could 
lead to an over- or underestimation of the effect of a regressor. By excluding 
variables that are correlated with the regressor, and in reality is a 
determinant of the dependent variable, the results of the analysis would be 
biased. Whether a bias is large or not depends therefore on the correlation 
between the independent variables and the error term. A larger correlation 
leads to a larger bias. (Stock 2007) Nonetheless, the regressions presented in 
this paper have a descriptive purpose and while we cannot say that the 
correlations are causal they are still of interest. 
In this thesis I use STATA 12 to perform a regression analysis to be able to 
determine and isolate components which are correlated with the repayment 
rate, and at what extent these variables influence repayment. The regression 
model used here has a linear function form.  
The studies mentioned in chapter 3 used several different models to 
investigate what factors affects the repayment rate in MFI’s. Having to 
concentrate the work of this thesis, I chose a set of key variables that I 
believe are likely to have an impact on the repayment rate. There are of 
course many factors not included in this analysis, which opens the 
possibility that there are more things that affect the loan client’s ability to 
repay than what will be discussed here.  
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Microfinance advocacy networks and donors generally suggest that female 
loan clients represent a lower credit risk. The main question of this study is 
therefore as following: 
Are female loan clients in D-MIRO less delayed on their loans than men? 
I also investigate whether marital status, age or educational level explain 
default risk. 
The basic model is:  
Delayed pay = β0 + β1 female + β2 age + β3 educational level + β4 marital status + e 
Where e is the error term that is assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean 0 and standard deviation σ.  
I then move on to investigate whether the other explanatory factors affect the 
default rate of men and women differently. This is done by first splitting the 
sample by gender but then also by interacting the female dummy variable 
with all the other independent variables. The interaction will allow me to see 
whether the differences in the effects are statistically significantly different 











4.3 Repayment by gender 
Table 2 Observations Mean Min Max Percent 
Delayed male 3273 529.5 1 2284 17.96 
Delayed female  4582 568.14 1 2303 17.20 
 
I created dummy variables for delayed females and delayed males in my 
sample. Table 2 shows that in the sample there are 4582 women versus 
3273 men defaulting on their loan. This means that 17.20 % of women in 
our sample are defaulting on their loan, versus 17.96 % of men (see table 1 
for total number of male and female loan clients). Women who are delayed 
with payment are on average approximately 38 days more delayed than men.  
 
Column 1 in Table 3 shows the correlation between gender and days delayed 
with repayment, when not controlling for any other variables. It seems to be 
no significant difference between women and men on the repayment rate. 
However, there may still be differences across the genders when we control 
for other variables that differ between them.  When I add the variables I wish 
to control for in the regression, in column 2, there is still no significant 
difference between men and women on the repayment rate. Not surprisingly 
the groups with least education are more delayed with repayment. Belonging 
to the youngest age group is correlated with less delay on repayment. Being 
married or cohabiting is also correlated with less delay on repayment. 
 
It may still be the case, however, that the effects of the control variables are 
different for men and women. For example, it may be the case that there is a 
difference between young women and young men, or between married 
women and married men. In order to test whether there are differences 
across the genders in the effects of these other variables I split the sample by 
gender and also run corresponding regressions with interaction terms. In 
particular, I will focus on the differential impact of age, marital status and 
educational level. 
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Table 3: Adding all control variables 
 (1) (2) 
 Gender All control 
variables 
female 2.620 -0.956 
 (0.89) (-0.32) 
   
age_young  -67.69*** 
  (-4.14) 




  (1.94) 
   
age_adult  11.36 
  (1.66) 
   
zero_ed  65.83* 
  (2.38) 
   
primary  78.51** 
  (3.14) 
   
basic  52.24* 
  (2.08) 




  (1.63) 
   
secondary  3.062 
  (0.12) 
   
married  -18.09*** 
  (-5.03) 
   
divorced  19.58** 
  (2.63) 
   
cohabit  -16.97*** 
  (-4.47) 
   
widower  -21.44* 
  (-2.09) 
   
_cons 95.11*** 43.52 
 (41.94) (1.69) 
N 44857 44857 
t statistics in parentheses 




4.4  Correlation between age and 
repayment 
Table 4: Correlation between age and repayment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Male Female 
age_young -77.11*** -90.68*** -67.60** 
 (-4.75) (-3.50) (-3.24) 
    
age_younga
dult 
5.219 -13.99 19.17* 
 (0.74) (-1.31) (2.05) 
    
age_adult 5.916 -1.243 11.44 
 (0.87) (-0.12) (1.27) 
    
_cons 92.04*** 101.1*** 85.27*** 
 (14.09) (10.25) (9.78) 
N 44857 18221 26636 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4 shows the connection between default rate and age. The age of D-
MIROs loan clients range from 17 to 79, and I’ve divided this interval into 
following groups:  
“age_young”: age < 21 
“age_youngadult”: age > 20 and age < 35 
“age_adult”: age >34 and age <61 
“age_old” age > 60 
I divided them into these groups to be able to see if there were any of the age 
groups that had a particular high degree of defaulting. I created interaction 
terms between the dummy variable female and the different age groups.  
In the appendix in table 9 I present these results.  
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From this we can see that young men on average default by approximately 
91 days less than the group “old”, those between 60-79 years. Young women 
pay back their loan on average by 23 days later than young men on average, 
but this difference is not statistically significant, as seen in appendix table 9. 
The total effect for young women is -91+ 23, so on average they default by 68 
days less than the oldest.  
Men in the group “young adult” default on average 14 days less than the 
group “old”, while women in the group “young adult” on average default by 
33 days more than men in the same group. The difference between men and 
women in the group “young adult” as we can see from the table, is 















4.5 Correlation between education and 
repayment 
 
Table 5: Correlation between education and repayment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Male Female 
zero_ed 64.15* 53.13 70.62 
 (2.32) (1.29) (1.88) 
    
primary 77.50** 77.83* 76.72* 
 (3.10) (2.13) (2.24) 
    
basic 51.10* 56.11 47.07 
 (2.03) (1.52) (1.37) 
    
medium_lev
el 
41.38 42.78 39.89 
 (1.66) (1.17) (1.17) 
    
secondary 6.234 13.00 1.550 
 (0.24) (0.34) (0.04) 
    
_cons 44.91 41.49 47.78 
 (1.81) (1.14) (1.40) 
N 44857 18221 26636 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
In table 5 we see the differential impact of education for men and women. 
There are 6 different educational levels in the dataset: those with zero 
education, primary level, basic level, medium level, secondary level and 
higher level.  
In the appendix in table 10 I present results where I created interaction 
terms between the dummy variable female and the different levels of 
education. From this it is showed that men with only primary level of 
education defaults by approximate 78 days more than men with higher 
education. This is significant at the 5 % level. The difference between men 
and women with this educational level is not statistically significant.   
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4.6  Correlation between marital status and 
repayment 
 
Table 6: Correlation between marital status and repayment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Male Female 
married -15.54*** -32.63*** -3.752 
 (-4.43) (-5.90) (-0.80) 
    
divorced 16.56* 8.218 20.33* 
 (2.24) (0.55) (2.37) 
    
cohabit -11.28** -20.18*** -7.427 
 (-3.03) (-3.53) (-1.45) 
    
widower -18.35 -4.418 -19.79 
 (-1.81) (-0.19) (-1.73) 
    
_cons 103.6*** 112.6*** 99.57*** 
 (45.80) (27.92) (36.37) 
N 44857 18221 26636 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
From table 6 we see that the relationship between being married and 
repayment for a male loan client means that he on average has 
approximately 33 days less delayed pay. This effect is significant at the 0.1 % 
level.  
In the appendix in table 11 I present results where I created interaction 
terms between the dummy variable female and the different dummy 
variables representing marital status. There is a statistically significant 
difference between married men and women, which is significant at the 
0.1 % level. Married women are on average 29 days more delayed with their 
repayment than married men. The total effect for married women is -33 + 29 
= - 4 days. We also see directly in Table 6 that the correlation between being 
married and late pay is not statistically significant for women.   
There is also a statistically significant effect from cohabiting; this effect is for 
some reason smaller. Men who cohabit pay back their loan on average 20 
days sooner than single men (which is the group omitted here), and this 
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effect is significant at the 0.1 % level. The interaction term fem_cohabit 
shows that there is a difference between cohabiting men and women, but 
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4.7  Combining all regressions   
In table 7 I include all regressions first separately, and then in the 5th row all 
together. There are some changes in the results when I put all of them 
together.  
The age group “age_young” is now significant 0.1 % level. A male loan client 
belonging to this group pays on average back their loan approximately 100 
days before those belonging to the group “old”. The difference between 
genders in this age-group is not statistically significant.  
A male loan client in the group “young_adult” pays on average back his loan 
13 days sooner than a male in the group old. A female loan client pays on 
average back her loan 45 days later than men in the same age group. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 % level.   
The correlation between being married and male means that married men on 
average has 42 days less delay on their loan-repayment. This is significant at 
0.1 % level. There is a statistically significant difference between married 
men and married woman which also is significant at 0.1 % level. A married 
woman pays on average back her loan 37.5 days later than a married man.  
A cohabiting male loan client is on average 30 days less delayed on his pay 
(significant at the 0.1 % level) while a cohabiting woman pays back her loan 









Table 7: Combining all regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Gender Age Education Marital 
status 
All 
female 2.620    -45.42 
 (0.89)    (-0.88) 
      
age_young  -81.66**   -100.3*** 
  (-3.25)   (-3.78) 
      
age_youngadult  -4.972   -13.13 
  (-0.65)   (-1.20) 
      
age_adult  7.771   3.100 
  (1.09)   (0.30) 
      
young_fem  7.294   50.53 
  (0.24)   (1.50) 
      
youngadult_fem  17.37**   45.16** 
  (3.28)   (3.10) 
      
adult_female  -3.099   15.26 
  (-0.84)   (1.10) 
      
zero_ed   49.72  46.86 
   (1.58)  (1.13) 
      
primary   74.42**  74.28* 
   (2.95)  (2.01) 
      
basic   52.70*  53.44 
   (2.07)  (1.44) 
      
medium_level   39.36  39.27 
   (1.57)  (1.06) 
 
 
     
secondary   9.589  7.145 
   (0.35)  (0.19) 
      
noedfem   23.78  32.82 
   (0.95)  (0.59) 
      
femprim   5.176  7.089 
   (0.94)  (0.14) 
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fembasic -2.756 -1.768 
   (-0.37)  (-0.04) 
      
femmedium   3.405  2.230 
   (0.82)  (0.04) 
      
 
femsecondary 




   (-0.36)  (-0.13) 
      
married    -23.62*** -41.71*** 
    (-5.31) (-7.22) 
      
divorced    17.24 1.983 
    (1.18) (0.13) 
      
cohabit    -11.16* -29.86*** 
    (-2.39) (-5.07) 
      
widower    4.599 -19.79 
    (0.20) (-0.86) 
      
fem_married    15.88** 37.53*** 
    (2.96) (5.06) 
      
fem_divorced    -0.890 24.77 
    (-0.05) (1.43) 
      
fem_cohabit    -0.255 16.90* 
    (-0.04) (2.17) 
      
fem_widow    -28.38 2.200 
    (-1.13) (0.09) 
      
_cons 95.11*** 92.04*** 44.91 103.6*** 71.95 
 (41.94) (14.09) (1.81) (45.81) (1.88) 
N 44857 44857 44857 44857 44857 
t statistics in parentheses 







4.8 Discussion of results 
The claim that women are better credit risk is often put forward by 
microfinance promoters and donors. D’Espallier et al. (2009), among others, 
report findings that indicate a higher repayment rate when the MFI is 
targeting women. Nevertheless, other studies, like Bhatt and Thang (2002) 
and Anthony and Horne (2003), argue that there is no evidence that female 
loan clients are better payers of microcredit loans.  
Analysis performed on data in this thesis show that there is no difference 
between men and women in general. However, through interaction terms 
that combine the effect of being female with other factors we do find some 
differences between repayment rates between men and women. This implies 
that different factors are of different importance for men and women.  
Bhatt and Thang (2002) and Olomola and Niser (2000) among others, found 
that higher levels of education leads to better repayment performance. This 
is in line with the findings here; loan clients with only primary level have a 
much higher default rate than those with higher levels of education.  The 
difference between men and women with these levels of education is not 
statistically significant. 
In addition, a significant effect of belonging to the youngest age group is 
found. On average members of this age group default by 100 days less than 
the oldest and this result is significant at 0.1 % level. Here the difference 
between men and women is not statistically significant. 
An interesting finding is that men in the group “young adult” default on 
average 13 days less than the group “old”. Women in this age group on the 
other hand, on average default by 45 days later than men. The difference 
between men and women in the group “young adult” as we can see from 
table 7, is statistically significant at the 1 % level.  
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As numbers from United Nations Statistics Division in figure 1 shows, 




Our dataset does not contain information about the loan client’s number of 
children. But it shows that women in the age-group where fertility is at its 
highest is more likely to default on their loan than men. An intuitive 
explanation of this would be that this is because women to a larger degree 
are caretakers of children. It does not necessarily mean that businesses led 
by women are more inefficient, or take higher risk, but that it can be 








Numbers for Ecuador from “The global gender gap report” (2008) show that 
there is inequality between men and women in Ecuador, for instance when it 
comes to wage for similar work. Table 8, taken from this report, shows that 
women earn on average 56 % of men’s earnings for similar work.  
Newman (2001) uses data from Ecuador to understand the impacts of 
women’s employment on household paid and unpaid labor allocation in her 
report “ Gender, Time Use, and Change: Impacts of Agricultural Export 
Employment in Ecuador”.  She compares two areas that are culturally 
similar, but differs in that the “treatment” area is in the area of the cut 
flower industry, which has a high demand for female labor, while the 
“control” is an economically more traditional valley. This study reveals large 
differences in time use by genders, which are independent of the effect of the 
flower sector. Men were working 3/4 of the time that women work, including 
housework, and correspondingly, women have much less leisure time than 
men. It is likely that these differences in household labor allocation may be 
an explanation for why women in the age-group “young adult” on average 
default by 45 days more than men in same age group. 
In line with the findings of Agarwal et al. (2010) our data shows that the 
effect of being married affects the default rate. Among D-MIROs clients it is 
here found that the effect of being married for a male loan client means that 
he on average has approximately 42 days less delayed pay on average. This 
effect is significant at the 0.1 % level. There is a statistically significant 
difference between married men and women, which is significant at the 
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0.1 % level. Married women are on average 38 days more delayed with their 
repayment than married men.  
There is also a significant effect from cohabiting; this effect is for some 
reason smaller. Men who cohabit pay back their loan on average 30 days 
sooner than single men (who is the group omitted here), and this effect is 
significant at the 0.1 % level. The interaction term fem_cohabit shows that 
cohabiting women are 17 days more delayed than cohabiting men, and this 
difference between men and women is significant at the 5 % level.  
 
The fact that there are such significant differences between married men and 
married women is interesting. As mentioned earlier, it is likely to believe that 
women in Ecuador to a higher degree are caretakers of children. This could 




A majority of MFIs in poor countries target women. There have been several 
suggestions claiming that women are better loan clients, since they take less 
risk and to a larger degree repay on time. However, there is little empirical 
evidence for this to be true, and there is no consensus among academics on 
the impact of microcredit. 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate reasons for the high default rate in 
D-MIRO in Ecuador. My approach was to look for differences between 
genders, as this a highly relevant theme in the microfinance world.  
Through the method of linear regression I utilized a set of control variables 
in the attempt to answer my research question: Are female loan clients in D-
MIRO less delayed on their loans than men? 
There seems to be no statistically significant difference between men and 
women on the repayment rate. Nonetheless, investigating the differential 
impact of other variables I find some differences between men and women. 
An interesting finding is that men in the group “young adult” default on 
average 13 days less than the group “old”, while women in this age group on 
average default by 45 days more than men. The difference between men and 
women in the group “young adult” as we can see from the table, is 
statistically significant at the 1 % level. I argue that this may come from that 
women in this age group to a larger degree than men takes care of children, 
and that this may be their reason for later repayment. The same effect is 
shown when controlling for marital status, which I believe supports this 
suggestion. Men who are married or cohabiting on average pay their loan 
back sooner than women who are married and cohabit.  
In other words, it is likely that these findings could come from that women to 
a larger degree take care of unpaid work within the home. This is in line with 
Newman’s (2001) study on the paid and unpaid labor allocation of 
households in Ecuador, which showed that there were large differences 
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between men’s and women’s amount of work, and that women have less 
leisure time than men. 
It is not unlikely that there is possible to find other differences between 
genders when comparing different characteristics. This seems to me to be 
necessary to be able to say with greater certainty which loan clients have the 
highest default rate. Suggestions for further research would for instance be 
to look at the different purposes for a microcredit loan, to see if there are 
differences between what types of businesses men and women want to start, 
and also to control for loan size. Geographical location could also be of 
interest, to see if there are any areas that stand out as problem-areas. This 
last effect could also be of interest if there are many of the same businesses 
located at the same place, thus leading to greater competition and making it 
harder to survive in the market.   
There are many aspects that still need to be controlled for. However, based 
on my results it is not possible to say that there are large differences in the 
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Table 9: Effect of age on repayment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











 (-4.75) (-3.50) (-3.24) (-3.46) 






 (0.74) (-1.31) (2.05) (-1.30) 
     
age_adult 5.916 -1.243 11.44 -1.243 
 (0.87) (-0.12) (1.27) (-0.12) 
     
female    -15.78 
    (-1.20) 
     
young_fem    23.08 
    (0.69) 
     
youngadult_fe
m 
   33.16
*
 
    (2.33) 
     
adult_female    12.69 
    (0.93) 










 (14.09) (10.25) (9.78) (10.13) 
N 44857 18221 26636 44857 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***






6.2  Effect of Education on repayment 
Table 10: Effect of education on repayment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Male Female All, with 
interaction 
terms 
zero_ed 64.15* 53.13 70.62 53.13 
 (2.32) (1.29) (1.88) (1.28) 
     
primary 77.50** 77.83* 76.72* 77.83* 
 (3.10) (2.13) (2.24) (2.10) 
     
basic 51.10* 56.11 47.07 56.11 
 (2.03) (1.52) (1.37) (1.51) 
     
medium_leve
l 
41.38 42.78 39.89 42.78 
 (1.66) (1.17) (1.17) (1.16) 
     
secondary 6.234 13.00 1.550 13.00 
 (0.24) (0.34) (0.04) (0.34) 
     
female    6.288 
    (0.13) 
     
noedfem    17.49 
    (0.31) 
     
femprim    -1.112 
    (-0.02) 
     
fembasic    -9.044 
    (-0.18) 
     
femmedium    -2.883 
    (-0.06) 
     
femsecondar
y 
   -11.45 
    (-0.22) 
     
_cons 44.91 41.49 47.78 41.49 
 (1.81) (1.14) (1.40) (1.13) 
N 44857 18221 26636 44857 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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6.3  Effect of marital status on repayment 
Table 11: Effect of marital status on repayment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









 (-4.43) (-5.90) (-0.80) (-5.83) 






 (2.24) (0.55) (2.37) (0.55) 








 (-3.03) (-3.53) (-1.45) (-3.49) 
     
widower -18.35 -4.418 -19.79 -4.418 
 (-1.81) (-0.19) (-1.73) (-0.19) 
     
female    -13.00
**
 
    (-2.65) 
     
fem_married    28.88
***
 
    (3.97) 
     
fem_divorced    12.11 
    (0.70) 
     
fem_cohabit    12.75 
    (1.66) 
     
fem_widow    -15.37 
    (-0.60) 










 (45.80) (27.92) (36.37) (27.58) 
N 44857 18221 26636 44857 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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